A simple application of bioeconomics to fisheries subsidies

Rashid Sumaila

Fisheries Economics Research Unit

Global Fisheries Cluster

The University of British Columbia

Vancouver, Canada

r.sumaila@oceans.ubc.ca





Classical Fisheries Management Problems

- Overfishing;
- Overcapacity;
- Low or negative profits.
- Bioeconomic models predict all these results!

These undesirable outcomes are the result of Individually Rational, but Non-cooperative Behavior

Bioeconomic Models

(1) Biological Model:

Net annual change of biomass =

Growth + Recruitment – Nat. Mortality – Catch

(2) Economic (Social) Model:

Net benefit = benefit - Cost

Solving the basic model

$$R = pH - cE$$

Schaefer Catch Equation: H = qEx (Highly Dubious!)

Therefore R = (pqx - c) E

Bionomic Equilibrium:

Under open access, fishery reduces the stock level x until R = 0, i.e.,

$$x = c/pq$$

Predictions: Zero rents; overfishing (if c/p low).

Numerical example

```
xo = 1,000,000 t

q = .001 / vessel yr

c = $500,000 / vessel yr
```

Price p (N/tonne)	x (Bionomic Eq.)
•	•

500	1,000,000 t
1,000	500,000
5,000	100,000

Fisheries subsidies

Fisheries subsidies are financial payments from public entities to the fishing sector, which help the sector make more profit than it would otherwise.

Bionomic equilibrium with & without subsidies


$$X = c/pq$$

$$X' = (c-s)/pq$$

$$X'' = c/(p+s)q$$

$$X''' = c/pq(1+a)$$

How subsidies induce overfishing



Gordon Schaefer bioeconomic model

Questions addressed

 What are the types and categories of fisheries subsidies?

 What is the amount of fisheries subsidies provided by countries, regions & globally?

 What proportion of estimated national subsidies go to small scale as compared to large scale fisheries?

Categories of subsidies

- Beneficial subsidies
 ('investment' programs in fish stocks).
- Harmful subsidies
 ('disinvestment' programs in fish stocks).
- Ambiguous subsidies (programs may benefit or harm fish stocks).

Computing subsidies


 Created a 'living' database of subsidies containing different types, for all maritime countries;


• The first version of the database was published in the mid-2000s (Sumaila *et al.* 2006; Khan *et al.* 2006).

Methods: splitting global subsidies into small- and large-scale fisheries

- By country and subsidy subtype;
- Data categorized into 3 groups.

- Assessed 74 countries (out of 147), representing 97% (\$34 of \$35 billion) of global total subsidies;
- Remaining 3% estimated based on sub-region and subtype averages.






Schuhbauer, Sumaila et al. (in prep.)


The results

Subsidies are substantial

- Capacity-enhancing subsidies 57% of total USD 35 billion
- Subsidies to developed country fisheries at 65%.




Fisheries subsidies Small versus large scale fisheries




Schuhbauer, Sumaila et al. (in prep.)

Subsidies are made for inequality




Fisheries subsidies by size by categories

Most capacityenhancing subsidies go to large scale fisheries (LSF).




Sumaila et al. (2013); Schuhbauer, Sumaila et al. (in prep.)

Mexican fisheries subsidies



Approximately **12%** of all fishing subsidies go to the small-scale sector Schuhbauer, Sumaila *et al.* (*in prep.*)

National effort: Indonesia



Summary results so far

- Global fisheries subsidies were estimated at about USD 35 billion;
- Bad subsidies were the highest categories provided at about USD 20 billion;
- Fuel subsidies was the highest type of subsidy provided;
- Only a small fraction of fisheries subsidies goes to small scale fishers;
- Large scale fisheries receive a higher proportion of capacity enhancing subsidies.

Thanks for your attention





